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Obamacare and Federalism’s Tug of War Within
--Erin Ryan
This month, the Supreme Court will decide what some believe will be among the most important
cases in the history of the institution.
In the “Obamacare” cases, the Court considers whether the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)
exceeds the boundaries of federal authority under the various provisions of the Constitution that
establish the relationship between local and national governance. Its response will determine the
fate of Congress’s efforts to grapple with the nation’s health care crisis, and perhaps other
legislative responses to wicked regulatory problems like climate governance or education policy.
Whichever way the gavel falls, the decisions will likely impact the upcoming presidential and
congressional elections, and some argue that they may significantly alter public faith in the Court
itself. But from the constitutional perspective, they are important because they will speak directly
to the interpretive problems of federalism that have ensnared the architects, practitioners, and
scholars of American governance since the nation’s first days.

Federalism is the Constitution’s mechanism for dividing authority between the national and local
levels. In a nutshell, it assesses which kinds of policy questions should be decided nationally—
yielding the same answer throughout the country—and which should be decided locally—
enabling different answers in different states. Accordingly, the basic inquiry in all federalism
controversies is always the same: who should get to decide? Is it the state or federal government
that should make these kinds of health policy choices? And just as important, especially in this
case, is who gets to answer that question—the political branches or the judiciary? Should the
Court defer to Congress’s choices in enacting the ACA, or is it the responsibility of the Court to
substitute its own judgment for the legislature’s on such matters?
To understand the quandaries of American federalism, a little history might help. In the first
attempt at structuring the fledgling United States, the drafters erred on the side of localized
autonomy in the failed Articles of Confederation, which established a union of powerful states
constrained by little centralized authority. But this format offered the new Americans inefficient
resources for managing interjurisdictional governance problems like interstate commerce,
border-crossing harms, or cooperative projects of infrastructure and defense. Learning from that
mistake, the Constitution’s architects sought a better balance—reserving broad authority to the
states to regulate for public welfare while delegating a set of specific and open-ended powers to
the federal government for resolving the collective action problems that confounded the states.
In service of this balance, the Constitution clearly delegates some responsibilities to one side or
the other—for example, the federal government guarantees equal protection of the laws and
regulates interstate commerce, while the states manage elections and regulate local land use. But
between the easy extremes are realms of governance in which it’s much harder to know what the
Constitution really tells us about who should be in charge. Locally regulated land uses become
entangled with the protection of navigable waterways that implicate interstate commerce and
border-crossing environmental harms. Voting rights cases merge election management with
equal protection concerns (e.g., Bush v. Gore). Health care providers are licensed at the state
level, but health insurance creates a national market of the sort long regulated by Congress.
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As a result, the Constitution creates spheres of state and federal authority that are at once
separated and overlapping, at least at the margins. The Constitution anticipates such overlap and
provides management tools via the Supremacy Clause, which clarifies that legitimate federal law
can always preempt conflicting state law. But even that isn’t the end of the issue, as the feds
often share regulatory space with the states even when preemption is clearly possible, especially
when state and local government brings useful capacity to the regulatory table.
Throughout American history, the question that keeps coming up—and that hangs in the balance
of the Obamacare cases—is just how big we should understand that marginal area of overlap to
be. Is that gray area between more clearly exclusive areas of national and local prerogative as
big as the ACA proponents contend, or as small as its detractors prefer? The Obamacare cases
most directly ask how best to understand the appropriate bounds of federal power, but the flipside of that question—how to understand the bounds of appropriate state power—is also
implicated. This is the issue that underlies the important preemption cases that also plague the
Court, such as this Term’s Arizona v. United States immigration-related case.
But here’s the thing. The reason these issues get so complicated—and so controversial—is that
the Constitution, beautiful as we may think it, usually doesn’t resolve them. Indeed, the problem
that pervades all federalism/preemption controversies is that the Constitution mandates but
incompletely describes our system of dual sovereignty, in a way that forces those implementing
it to rely on some external theory about what American federalism is for and how it should
operate when applying its vague directives to actual controversies. And unsurprisingly, there are
multiple competing theories, all consistent with those directives but pushing us in different
directions.
Two have especially influenced the Court’s notoriously vacillating approach to understanding
federalism. The “dual federalism” approach prefers stricter separation between proper spheres of
state and federal power, policed by judicially-enforced constraints that trump legislative
determinations. For example, the Court followed dual federalism thinking when it rejected
federal remedies under the Violence Against Women Act in United States v. Morrison in 2000,
and if it follows that approach in the ACA cases, it would likely strike down Obamacare as the
appropriate vindicator of appropriate limits on federal power. Dual federalism thinkers see
federalism as a zero-sum game, in which any expansion of federal reach comes at the direct
expense of state reach, and vice versa.
By contrast, the “cooperative federalism” approach rejects the zero-sum model and tolerates
greater jurisdictional overlap. Cooperative federalism urges judicial deference to federalismsensitive policymaking, on grounds that “political safeguards” for federalism are already built
into legislative decision-making by constitutional design, given that national representatives are
elected at the state level. The Court has repeatedly relied on cooperative federalism thinking in
upholding Congress’s use of federal funds to bargain for shared regulatory jurisdiction over
social programs like Social Security and Medicare, or the regulation of education and health
care. If the Court follows that approach in the ACA cases, it might defer to the interpretive
choices of the democratically-elected legislature in deciding an issue that falls through the cracks
of more clearly articulated constitutional lines.
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The battle between these classic contenders of federalism theory was on full display during the
ACA oral arguments. For example, the question most vexing Justice Kennedy about the
individual mandate was that of federal limits. If the federal government can do this, he asked,
then what can’t it do? Does affirming a mandate like this one effectively eviscerate all
determinable limits of federal power under the Commerce Clause or any other? Could Congress
next order us to eat broccoli, for all the same reasons it can require us to buy health insurance?
In this respect, he voiced the dual federalism perspective, suggesting that judicial safeguards
might be necessary to police the boundaries of federal authority. (Begging the question: if it
were the state government ordering us to eat broccoli, would that be okay?)
Donald Verrilli, the Solicitor General defending the ACA, replied from the cooperative
federalism perspective that the effective limits on federal power were located in the democratic
process itself. He argued that nobody can seriously imagine a congressional mandate to eat
broccoli, because to the extent Americans believe this unreasonable, they will not elect
representatives who would create it (and they will replace any who do). In other words, he
answered with the political-safeguards refrain that Congress can reliably make gray area
regulatory choices, because interpreting that zone of overlap is more amenable to legislative
deliberation than bright-line judicial review. (So as long as the Congress that orders us to eat
broccoli is duly elected, federalism is satisfied?)
This moment of Supreme Court dialog, reiterating a conversation hallowed by centuries of
repetition, reveals the rabbit-hole in which federalism debates have languished for too long—
stuck between the dual and cooperative federalism alternatives of jurisdictional separation or
overlap, and judicial or legislative interpretive hegemony. The dual federalism approach
imagines that the very purpose of federalism is to draw lines between state and federal power (no
matter how arbitrary they may be in the gray area), and credits the judiciary as best-poised to
interpret such bright-line constitutional crystals. The cooperative federalism approach better
understands the unavoidable mud of jurisdictional overlap and appropriately credits political
safeguards in circumstances where judicial review is unworkable—but itself lacks a satisfying
theoretical answer to the question of who should decide. And neither approach gives us the tools
we really need to evaluate the broccoli law, or any other.
A better approach to resolving federalism controversies like Obamacare frames the “who
decides” question as neither a quest for bright-line boundaries nor pure faith in the political
process, but as an examination of how the challenged governance relates to the values that
underlie American federalism in the first place.
Americans invented federalism to help us actualize a set of good-governance goals in operation
of the new union. We created checks and balances between local and national power to protect
individuals against governmental overreaching or abdication on either side. Federalism fosters
local autonomy and interjurisdictional competition, and we hope it will promote governmental
accountability that enhances democratic participation throughout the jurisdictional spectrum.
Federalism facilitates the problem-solving synergies that arise between the separate strengths of
local and national governance for dealing with different parts of interjurisdictional problems. On
balance, if governance advances these values, then it is consistent with the Constitution’s
federalism directives. If it detracts from them, we have a problem.
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The trick, of course, is that while all of these values are independently good things, they are
nevertheless suspended in tension with one another, such that you can’t always satisfy all of
them at the same time. Sometimes local autonomy pulls in the opposite direction from checksand-balances, which can alternatively frustrate problem-solving synergy. These tensions expose
the values “tug of war” within federalism, highlighting the inevitable tradeoffs in
interjurisdictional governance that makes it so difficult. It also reveals why the line-drawing
exercises of dual federalism are ultimately unsatisfying—a two dimensional approach for
resolving a multi-dimensional problem on a wholly separate plane of analysis.
Federalism’s tug of war suggests that the most robust approach for resolving federalism
controversies should be tethered to a more transparent consideration of how challenged
governance fails or succeeds in advancing these fundamental values: checks and balances,
accountable governance, local autonomy, and interjurisdictional synergy. It should also take
advantage of the relative capacities of the different branches of government for considering these
factors in different circumstances.
And that’s just what the Court should be doing in analyzing the ACA. Rather than asking
whether the law violates some abstract limit on federal power, the Court should ask whether the
trade-offs against some federalism values are justified in service to others.
The states submit that the law compromises local autonomy too much, and the federal
government maintains that the need for collective-action problem-solving justifies any intrusion,
which is limited by the flexibility the law confers on states to create alternative programs and to
opt out entirely by declining federal funds. The plaintiffs argue that the individual mandate
compromises the very individual rights that checks and balances are designed to protect, while
the defendants protest that there is no recognized right to not buy health insurance, especially
when the failure to do so externalizes harms to other individuals. They might further argue that
both checks and synergy values are served by the use of a regulatory partnership approach to
health reform rather than full federal preemption. And so on.
In a new book, Federalism and the Tug of War Within, I offer a theory of Balanced Federalism to
facilitate these foundational inquiries. Federalism analysis tethered to underlying constitutional
values would help ensure governance that best advances them, and it would defuse the frequent
constitutional grandstanding in which federalism is strategically deployed to mask substantive
policy disagreements. In the end, the question should not be whether only the state or also the
federal government can make us eat broccoli; it is whether there are any constitutionally
compelling reasons for either to do so. Either way, one thing remains clear: no matter what the
Court decides this month, we are sure to be talking about it for a very long time.

--Professor Erin Ryan, eryan@lclark.edu, is currently a Fulbright Scholar in China, returning to
Lewis & Clark Law School this summer. She is the author of Federalism and the Tug of War
Within (Oxford, 2012).
An abbreviated version of this essay appeared on RegBlog on June 21, 2012, at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2012/06/21-ryan-federalism.html, cross-posted to ACS.
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